



Anatomy of a targeted Cyber attack

Cybersecurity from the Attacker's point of view



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
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Cyber Attack Phases

LIFECYCLE OF A RANSOMWARE INCIDENT

The common attack paths of a human-operated ransomware incident based on examples CERT NZ has seen.



New Zealand Government



INSPIRED BY TRUE STORIES

BANKING SCAM

- Organization reports a successful banking scam.
- Customer affirms that an authentic email has been sent from the key account manager.

Evidence (from the DFIR report):

- KAM email delivered to the customer is **authentic**.
- **Unauthorized access** to the KAM email account has been detected.
- **Personal KAM email** is included in «have i been pwned».
- No **MFA** is configured.



Speculation:

- KAM **re-uses mnemonic passwords** for personal and work accounts.
- Attacker, targeting the organization, conducted an analysis through social networks (LinkedIn), and **past data breaches**.
- Attacker found a **valid account** (the KAM one).
- Attacker **analyzed past email conversations** and waited for the best «time window»
- Attacker sends an authentic email requesting a bank transfer using a different IBAN (**evidence**).
- Attacker **sells collected data** on dark web marketplaces.



Techniques:

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
 - 0001 Credentials -> T1110.0001
 - 0002 Email Addresses -> RocketReach
 - 0003 Employee Names -> LinkedIn, RocketReach
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
 - 0002 Business Relationships -> LinkedIn
 - 0004 Identify Roles -> LinkedIn
- T1110 Brute Force
 - 0001 Credential Stuffing

MITRE
ATT&CK™



Remediation plan:

- MFA
- Policies and contracts
- Awareness



SPEAR PHISHING

- Organization reports highly targeted malicious emails delivered to several critical employees and customers.

Evidence (from the DFIR report):

- Minor email account has been compromised.
- **One-touch MFA** was configured.
- Targeted user accepted a login request.



Speculation:

- The attacker **known the password** associated to the compromised email account.
- The attacker **collected interesting information** from the compromised email account (conversations, address book, enterprise contacts, public folders...)
- The attacker used that information to launch highly targeted attacks to **VIP** (employees and customers).





Techniques:

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
 - 0001 Credentials -> T1110.0001
 - 0002 Email Addresses -> RocketReach
- T1110 Brute Force
 - 0001 Credential Stuffing
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1566 Phishing
 - 002 Spearphishing Link



Remediation plan:

- MFA redesign
- Antispam
- Policies and contracts
- Improve detection
- Awareness



LESSON LEARNED

- Social Engineering based attacks are actually effective.
- Email compromises are «personal data breach».
- Security controls are useless unless they are designed taking into account the attacker's mindset.
 - Evaluate the risk of knowing the attackers.



Cyber Security Mindset



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